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As corporate social responsibility and business ethics continue to grab our attention,
evermore-sophisticated "best practices" and compliance strategies emerge. A key practice
that anchors many corporate social responsibility programs and compliance initiatives is
launching and publicizing an internal whistleblower procedure, report channel, or "hot-
line"' that entices insiders to denounce colleagues' misdeeds so management can root out
corporate crimes, corruption, and cover-ups.
Within the United States, workplace whistleblower hotlines are a largely uncontrover-
sial "best practice" to which few ever object. But tensions rise when a multinational or-
ganization extends report channels abroad. Overseas, whistleblower hotlines can spark
blowback from staff, employee representatives, and government enforcers and can trigger
confounding legal issues that do not appear in the United States. To a socially responsible
American, the hurdles impeding foreign whistleblower hotlines look higher than they
should have any right to get.
Workplace whistleblower hotlines take many forms. Some stand on their own while
others comprise part of a broader corporate code of conduct, code of ethics, or compli-
ance or social responsibility program. Some run in-house while others are outsourced.
There are single global hotlines and there are aligned but separate report channels across
local affiliates. Some hotlines are closed to staff in certain countries. Whatever the form
or reach, the idea behind a workplace hotline is simple: empower insiders who hear about
* International Employment Law Partner, White & Case LLP, New York City. A.B. University of
Chicago 1982; J.D. University of Florida College of Law 1985; adjunct professor of International
Employment Law at John Marshall Law School, Chicago. The author thanks Manuel Martinez-Herrera of
White & Case for significant contributions.
1. This article uses "hotline" to mean any report channel or other internal system or procedure designed
to collect whistleblower complaints, regardless of the structure and the medium (media might include, for
example, telephone, email, interactive website, postal mail, social networking, or a combination). See infra
note 21.
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white-collar crime, policy breaches, or other wrongdoing to come forward with allega-
tions so management can investigate, right wrongs, and punish the guilty.
Prison, gangster, and schoolyard cultures revile "snitches," "stool pigeons," and "tattle-
tales, and what Melville's Billy Budd reviled as "the dirty work of a telltale."2 But corpo-
rate culture in America and many other modern societies reveres company and political
whistleblowers as do-gooders who expose corruption for the benefit of all. Look at all the
Hollywood movies championing real-life informants. What was a trickle of based-on-a-
true-story whistleblower-themed film dramas-Serpico, All the President's Men, The Insider,
Erin Brockovich-is now, in our post-Enron/post-Madoff age of "Occupy Wall Street," a
steady stream-The Whistleblower, The Informant!, Fair Game, Puncture, Enron: The
Smartest Guys in the Room, and Chasing Madoff Americans who watch these movies root
for whistleblowers standing up to white-collar criminals and fighting for corporate ac-
countability. In the workplace, too, rank-and-file Americans tend to welcome
whistleblowing (and hence company whistleblower hotlines) as a check against abuses of
management. American executives, meanwhile, champion whistleblowing (and hotlines)
to support compliance and avert scandals and bet-the-company litigation. Everybody
wins-except criminals brought to justice.
But this accommodating view of corporate whistleblowing (and hotlines) is not univer-
sal. A cultural component divides some places from the rest. Whistleblowing-averse soci-
eties from Russia and Latin America to the Middle East and India to parts of Asia and
much of Africa fear reprisals and retaliation so much that they suspect workplace
whistleblower hotlines as tools for entrapment. In jurisdictions such as Korea, corporate
whistleblowing is taboo,3 and parts of Continental Europe resist anonymous whistleblow-
ing (and hence anonymous hotlines) surprisingly vehemently.4 European workers may see
hotlines as a threat to privacy-their own and that of powerful wrongdoers. An article in
the New York Times says that in "much of Continental Europe" a "less swashbuckling atti-
tude toward matters of privacy offer[s] the powerful," such as corporate officers, "a degree
of protection that would be unthinkable in Britain or the United States."5 The Times
article points out that "French politicians have been able to hide behind some of Europe's
tightest privacy laws, protected by what amounted to a code of silence about the transgres-
sions of the mighty."6 An article in the Yale Law Journal explores why Continental
Europeans approach workplace privacy (and, by extension, workplace whistleblowing) so
very differently from our outlook stateside:
2. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR: (AN INSIDE NARRATIVE) ch. 15, ][ 5 (1962).
3. See Choe Sang-Hun, Help Wanted: Korean Busybodies With Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A6,
All (Korea is "a country where corporate whistle-blowing is virtually unheard of-such actions are seen as a
betrayal of the company [and] carry a social stigma").
4. To Americans, facilitating anonymous whistleblowing encourages candid reports from otherwise-reluc-
tant sources. According to Stephen M. Kohn, Executive Director of the National Whistleblowers Center,
"[a]nonyinity gets people to file [denunciations] and gets people with a lot to lose to file. The ability to be
anonymous is a real game changer in terms of [enhancing potential whistleblowers' willingness to file."
Stephen Joyce, SEC Officials: Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program Has Resulted in Higher Quality Tips, 215 Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), at EE-1 3 (Nov. 7, 2011). Europe stands in sharp contrast. See Donald C. Dow-
ling, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines Across Europe: Directions Through the Maze, 42 INT'L LAW. 1,
11-16, 21-28 (2008) [hereinafter Dowling SOX]. As to this article's operative definition of "workplace
whistleblower hotline," see supra note 1 and infra note 21.
5. Alan Cowell, Scandals Redefine Rules for the Press in Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2011, at Al3.
6. Id.
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[W]e are in the midst of significant privacy conflicts between the United States and
the countries of Western Europe-conflicts that reflect unmistakable differences in
sensibilities about what ought to be kept "private."
. . . To people accustomed to the continental way of doing things, American law
seems to tolerate relentless and brutal violations of privacy in [many] areas of law ....
. . . American privacy law seems, from the European point of view, simply to have
"failed."
. . . Americans and Europeans are, as the Americans would put it, coming from differ-
ent places. At least as far as the law goes, we do not seem to possess general "human"
intuitions about the "horror" of privacy violations. We possess something more com-
plicated than that: We possess American intuitions-or, as the case may be, Dutch,
Italian, French, or German intuitions ....
... Maybe Europeans feel that their personhood is confirmed by the fact that their
bosses are obliged to respect their privacy in the workplace ....
... Everybody [in Continental Europe] is protected against disrespect, through the
continental law of "insult," a very old body of law that protects the individual right to
"personal honor." Nor does it end there. Continental law protects the right of work-
ers to respectful treatment by their bosses and coworkers, through what is called the
law of "mobbing" or "moral harassment." This is law that protects employees against
being addressed disrespectfully, shunned, or even assigned humiliating tasks like
xeroxing. 7
In societies that value personal privacy above corporate compliance, rank-and-file em-
ployees tend to fear workplace whistleblowing, particularly anonymous whistleblowing, as
ruthless worker-on-worker espionage.8 A confidential hotline makes every colleague and
co-worker a potential spy, and facilitates unscrupulous rivals lodging false accusations.
European workforces get especially queasy when an employer accompanies an anonymous
hotline with a mandatory reporting rule-a common provision in multinational codes of
conduct that forces employee witnesses to denounce misconduct or else get fired.9 Conti-
7. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE LJ. 1151,
1155-57, 1159-60, 1163-65 (2000) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
8. Some countries outside the common law tradition, such as European regimes that suffered under Nazis,
fascists, and Communists, fear anonymous whistleblowing as potentially treacherous and see anonymous
whistleblowers as untrustworthy and dangerous sneaks who escape accountability for their denunciations.
These cultures fear anonymous hotlines as lures that might tempt a jealous or vindictive grudge holder to
accuse rivals of exaggerated or fabricated misdeeds. These cultures even seem to distrust corporations' skill in
conducting unbiased internal investigations into whistleblower allegations. This is, however, a generaliza-
tion. Not every Continental European fears whistleblowers and elevates personal privacy above corporate
compliance. Indeed, corporate governance mavens in parts of Continental Europe may be coming over to
the Anglo view that values even anonymous whistleblowing (and hence corporate whistleblower hotlines) as a
powerful weapon in the fight against corporate wrongdoing. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 11-16.
9. Americans see mandatory reporting rules as a clear best practice. See Holly J. Gregory, W4Vhistleblower
Bounty Rules: Impact on Corporate Compliance Programs, 2011 PRAc. L. J. 20, 20 ("Corporate codes of conduct
typically provide that employees have an obligation to come forward with information about potential wrong-
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nental Europeans are quick to draw analogies here to anonymous neighbor-on-neighbor
betrayals under the Stasi and Nazis that sparked torture and murderlo-a period when the
"sea of denunciations and human meanness" swelled to overwhelm even Adolf Hitler."
Beyond Europe, many societies fear whistleblowing reprisals, loathe mandatory reporting
rules, and see an employer non-retaliation guarantee as a trap.
Laws exist to resolve conflicts in society.12 In American society, corporate fraud sparks
passionate conflict, so Americans tend to embrace corporate whistleblowing and hotlines
doing .... Without [this] direct reporting from employees, the company is hindered in its ability to identify
potential problems, investigate and take timely corrective action."). Mandatory reporting rules support em-
ployers' internal investigations, such the scenario where an internal investigation does not uncover quite
enough evidence to prove all implicated parties actively committed wrongdoing, but where the investigation
confirms that some peripheral conspirators helped cover up malfeasance they demonstrably knew about.
Mandatory reporting rules in international codes of conduct raise delicate issues of international and foreign-
local employment law, issues beyond the scope of this article (which addresses international whistleblower
hotlines). For a discussion by this author of mandatory reporting rules, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 6,
17, 44-45. For a discussion by this author of multinationals' cross-border internal investigations, see Donald
C. Dowling, Jr., Conducting Internal Employee Investigations Outside the United States, in 2010 EMPLOYMENT
LAw UPDATE ch. 2 (Henry H. Perritt ed., 2010), reprinted in 35 N.Y. ST. B.A. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 4 (2010)
[hereinafter Dowling Investigations].
10. For examples of Europeans drawing this analogy, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 12. Compare, as
one example of an anonymous denunciation under the Nazis leading to torture, the case of Joseph Schachno,
a U.S.-citizen expatriate doctor practicing medicine in a Berlin suburb during Hitler's rise to power:
On the night of June 21 t1933], Schachno [was] visited at his home by a squad of uniformed men
responding to an anonymous denunciation of him as a potential enemy of the state. The men
searched his place, and although they found nothing, they took him to their headquarters.
Schachno was ordered to undress and immediately subjected to a severe and prolonged beating by
two men with a whip. Afterward, he was released .... He lay in bed for a week. As soon as he
felt able, he went to the [U.S.] consulate [which] ordered him taken to a hospital ....
ERIK LARSON, IN THE GARDEN OF BEASTS: LOVE, TERROR, AND AN AMERICAN FAMILY IN HITLER'S BER-
LIN 4 (2011). Describing the beating, Larson adds, "From the neck down to the heels he was a mass of raw
flesh," as "he had been beaten with whips and in every possible way until his flesh was literally raw and
bleeding." Id. at 3.
Larson adds:
[In 1930's Germany,] petty jealousies flared into denunciations made to the ... Storm Troopers-
or to the ... Gestapo .... The Gestapo's reputation for omniscience and malevolence arose from
... the existence of a populace eager . . . to use Nazi sensitivities to satisfy individual needs and
salve jealousies . . . . [O]f a sample of 213 denunciations, 37 percent arose not from heartfelt political
belief but from private conflicts, with the trigger often breathtakingly trivial. In October 1933, for
example, the clerk at a grocery store turned in a cranky customer who had stubbornly insisted on
receiving three pfennigs in change. The clerk accused her of failure to pay taxes. Germans de-
nounced one another with such gusto that senior Nazi officials urged the populace to be more discriminating
as to what circumstances might justify a report to the police. Hitler himself acknowledged . . . "we
are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness."
Id. at 57 (emphasis added). But cf Whitman, supra note 7, at 1165 (arguing that the "Nazism" explanation for
the Continental Europeans conception of personal privacy generally-but outside the whistleblowing con-
text-is too facile because it ignores pre-Nazi-era history).
11. See LARSON, supra note 10, at 57 ("Germans denounced one another with such gusto that ... Hitler
himself acknowledged . . . 'we are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness.'").
12. Cf JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRms: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEmOcRzAcY 263 (William Rehg, trans., MIT Press 2d ed. 1996) (1992) (arguing that demo-
cratic laws are "procedures according to which citizens can, in the exercise of their right to self-determina-
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that encourage it.13 U.S. law tends to support, even mandate, workplace hotlines, and
U.S. corporations embrace hodines in their push for "full compliance."1 4 By contrast, an
employer that promotes whistleblowing in whistleblowing-averse societies like Russia,
Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and Africa, causes conflict. And, be-
cause invading personal privacy sparks conflict among Continental Europeans,' 5 Euro-
pean legal systems actively block many types of personal data processing' 6 and interpret
data protection laws to rein in'the launch and staffing of hotlines. 7 This frustrates U.S.
multinationals that buy into the "best practice" of report channels supporting compli-
ance-especially those multinationals that think U.S. law actively requires offering hot-
lines overseas. 8 Many see the United States and European positions here as "seemingly
contradictory regulatory regimes."l 9 The Wall Street Journal once quoted someone saying
tion, successfully pursue the cooperative project of establishing just (i.e., relatively more just) conditions of
life.").
13. Every modem society rejects corporate misconduct, but modern U.S. society seems to be particularly
vigilant in this regard. As just one example, in August 2011 a U.C.LA law professor publicly called for the
U.C.L.A. School of Law to reject a $10 million gift donated by Lowell Milken because, over twenty-five years
before, Milken's brother had been convicted in junk-bond scandals. Julie Creswell & Peter Lattman, Milken
Gift Stirs Dispute at U.C.LA., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at Bl. The donor himself, Lowell, had never been
convicted and had never "admit[ted] to any wrongdoing." Id. Protest notwithstanding, U.C.L.A. took the
money. Id.
14. See infra Part II(A)(1). On why the U.S. social concept of privacy and U.S. privacy law are compatible
with phenomena like corporate whistleblower hotlines, see generally Whitman, supra note 7. As to U.S.
corporations' push for compliance, see generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., U.S.-Based Multinational Employers
and the "Social Contract" Outside the United States, 43 INT'L LAW. 1237, as reprinted in 26 ABAJ. LAB. & EMp.
L. 77 (2010).
15. See generally Whitman, supra note 7. For a discussion on "proportionality," see Dowling SOX, supra
note 4.
16. See Council Directive 95/46, EU Data Privacy Directive, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). For analysis
of this directive, see generally Donald C. Dowling & Jeremy M. Mittman, International Privacy Law, in PROS-
KAUER ON PRvAcy: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURrrY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 14-1
(Kristen Mathews ed., 2006); Whitman, supra note 7.
17. See infra Part 11(C).
18. For discussion of whether U.S. law actually requires hotlines abroad, see infra Part II(A)(1). As to U.S.
opinion that it does, see, for example, DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING:
THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 162 (2d ed. 2004) ("it would be prudent to assume [that SOX
enforcers will treat SOX as extending abroad] because foreign issuers whose shares are traded on U.S. stock
exchanges are not exempt from securities filing requirements"). According to a U.S. law firm newsletter of
August 2011, "[rlegulatory decisions in [Europe] cast doubt on the legality of whistleblowing hotlines within
the EU, and companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges appear to face a difficult choice between two seemingly
contradictory regulatory regimes." Heather Egan Sussman & Alison Wetherfield, An Employer's Guide to
Implementing EU-Compliant Whistleblowing Hotlines, McDermott Newsletter (McDermott Will & Emery)
Aug. 23, 2011, available at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail. These "two
seemingly contradictory regulatory regimes" refer to a widespread interpretation that Sarbanes Oxley § 301
(cited and discussed infra at Part II(A)(1)) extends extraterritorially-an interpretation that might be inconsis-
tent with the U.S. Supreme Court decision Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
19. Sussman & Wetherfield, supra note 18. As to the SEC position: in April 2003, the SEC issued an early
release interpreting SOX and saying the SEC declines to take a "one-size-fits-all" approach to regulating
whistleblower hotlines and will not "mandat[e] specific [hotline report] procedures" for a number of reasons
including the fact that "large, multi-national [sic] corporations [employ] thousands of employees in many
differentjurisdictions," presumably meaning different nations, as opposed to different U.S. jurisdictions. Stan-
dards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees Release, Securities Act Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2876 (Apr. 9, 2003) (emphasis added) (SEC release implementing Exchange Act § 10A(m)(l)
as amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 772, § 301).
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the conflict here effectively orders multinationals either to "chop off [their] left hand or
chop off [their] right hand." 20 Beyond Europe, those jurisdictions where workers fear
hotlines as entrapment also impose hotline restrictions.
This article is a toolkit for a compliance-focused multinational that wants to launch a
workplace whistleblower hotline across worldwide operations and therefore needs to com-
ply with hotline restrictions overseas.21 The discussion splits into halves, one conceptual,
and one practical. Part One, the conceptual part, explores why any legal system would
restrict whistleblower hotlines when no jurisdiction restricts whistleblowing itself and
when few whistleblowers even bother with hotlines. Part Two, the practical part, analyzes
the six categories of laws that restrict global whistleblower hotlines, focusing on compli-
ance strategy.22
I. Part One: Why Restrict Whistleblower Hotlines Without Regulating
Whistleblowing Itself, When so Few Whistleblowers even Bother with
Hotlines?
A workplace whistleblower hotline comprises three basic components: (1) a communica-
tion that (a) encourages (or forces) 23 employees to denounce colleagues suspected of
wrongdoing, (b) explains how to submit a denunciation, and (c) (often) guarantees confi-
dentiality or anonymity and non-retaliation; (2) a medium or media (channel or channels)
for accepting denunciations, such as an email address, web link, postal mail address, tele-
phone number, or some combination; and (3) protocols/procedures and scripts by which a
hotline responder, often a specialist outsourced company,24 processes denunciations and
passes them onto someone at the hotline-sponsor company to investigate. Internal inves-
tigations into whistleblower denunciations raise tough legal issues of their own, particu-
larly in the cross-border context, but investigations into specific denunciations are
20. David Reilly and Sarah Nassauer, Tip-line Bind: Follow the Law in U.S. or EU?, WALL S-r. J., Sept. 6,
2005, at Cl. For similar analogies in this context, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 3, n. 6.
21. This article addresses workplace-context whistleblower hotlines because most regulations specific to hot-
lines are specific to employee hotlines. Some corporate hotlines are open to stakeholders like customers, sup-
pliers, contractors, and the general public, in addition to employees. Opening a hotline to informants other
than staff raises few, if any, legal issues beyond the ones discuss here. Further, hotlines tend to attract most of
their calls from current and former employees, not from outsiders.
22. In 2008 this author published a study of the legal issues the reach whistleblower hotlines launched in
Europe. See generally Dowling SOX, supra note 4. The present article updates some of the points in the 2008
piece and takes a global focus-beyond Europe.
23. See Gregory, supra note 9, for a discussion of employer mandatory reporting rules.
24. Hotline-sponsoring multinationals often contract with specialist outsourcer companies to respond to
hotline calls. Indeed, a mini-industry of niche "hotline outsourcers" has emerged, comprising companies that
respond to hotline calls purportedly in any language. See, e.g., EthicsPoint.com, Beyond Compliance: Imple-
menting Effective Whistleblower Hotline Reporting Systems, http://www.ethicspoint.com/articles/whitepa-
pers/beyond-compliance-implementing-effective-whistleblower-hotline-reporting-systems (last visited Jan. 1,
2012). The ability to outsource a cross-border hotline offers a hotline sponsor some distinct advantages-
impartiality, specialized expertise-but also triggers additional legal issues because giving an outsider access
to highly-confidential denunciations necessarily discloses sensitive data outside the company (even though, in
the hotline context, the sensitive transmissions come from individual whistleblowers, not the employer). Par-
ticularly in Europe, using an outsourcer implicates the data protection/privacy law concepts of "onward trans-
fer" and, where the outsourcer is outside the European Economic Area, "data export." See Dowling SOX,
supra note 4, at 24-25, 48; cf chart, infra Part II(C).
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completely separate from this topic, the pre-investigatory launch, and the operation of a
workplace whistleblower hotline. 25
In many societies, distrust of or aversion to whistleblowing 26 combines with particularly
protective local privacy and labor laWS27 to spawn six distinct legal doctrines 28 that restrict
multinational employers' freedom to launch anonymous whistleblower hodines across in-
ternational operations. 29 But to Americans, the fact that any jurisdiction resists workplace
hotlines seems counterintuitive. A government should encourage, not frustrate, busi-
nesses policing themselves to comply with the government's own laws. Yes, social forces
and public policy in some places seem hostile to whistleblowing, and yes, some societies
aggressively ban hotlines that "disproportionately" invade personal privacy. But legisla-
tively restricting hotlines raises a paradox: even the most privacy-protective legal systems
on Earth do not dare restrict whistleblowing itself.30 Why restrict channels that merely
facilitate otherwise legal whistleblowing?
As a practical matter, "free-form" whistleblowing-truthful solo denunciations outside
formal report channels-is probably impossible to regulate without prior restraints.
Whistleblowing intrinsically links to speech, secrecy, and human interaction. In its most
basic form, whistleblowing is ubiquitous-quite literally child's play: every toddler tattling
on a sibling's misbehavior to mother and every kindergartner bringing an unruly classmate
to the attention of teacher is a whistleblower. No free society can prohibit or materially
restrict whistleblowing without imposing intolerable prior restraints on speech. And dic-
tatorial, repressive, and fascist governments do not want to restrict whistleblowing; they
encourage denunciations to police lawbreakers. Even the legal systems that are most hos-
tile to hotlines leave free-form whistleblowing-including anonymous whistleblowing-
completely unrestricted.3'
With whistleblowing unrestricted, why rein in channels that merely receive otherwise-
legal whistleblower reports? The historical (and practical) way that governments, free and
authoritarian alike, censor speech is to restrict the speaker, not the listener. No federal
communications law would restrict radio receivers but leave radio broadcasts unregulated.
Merely crippling hotlines leaves would-be whistleblowers free to denounce colleagues any
other way they want, anonymously or not, by telephone, written note, postal mail, e-mail,
25. Investigating a hotline-received whistleblower denunciation opens its own Pandora's Box of legal is-
sues-issues that follow after the launch of a company whistleblower hotline. Not all whistleblower hotline
complaints lead to internal investigations and not all internal investigations are sparked by denunciations
received via hotline. For analysis and inventory of international internal investigation issues, see generally
Dowling Investigations, supra note 9.
26. See supra notes 1-4, 7-11 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., supra notes 4, 7-11 and accompanying text.
28. This article addresses these six doctrines infra Part II.
29. On workplace hotlines versus hotlines open to non-employee stakeholders, see supra note 21.
30. No known jurisdiction imposes any law that acts as a prior restraint on speech to forbid private citizens
from truthfully reporting others' misdeeds to private third parties (or to government/police authorities, for
that matter). Yet legal doctrines could conceivably be triggered under certain narrow whistleblower scena-
rios. For example, a government employee whistleblower could illegally divulge state secrets; a corporate
officer whistleblower could breach a fiduciary duty; a lawyer whistleblower could breach the attorney-client
privilege; a whistleblower party to a confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement could breach the agreement.
31. This part of the article discusses restrictions against free-form whistleblowing, not laws that promote or
require whistleblowing. Part II(B), infra, discusses laws that promote denunciations to government
authorities.
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text message, on-line chat room, tweet, social media, web post, letter to the editor, spread-
ing rumors, contacting government authorities, tying a note to a rock thrown through a
window-whatever. With a smorgasbord of non-hotline channels available, restricting
only hotlines seems futile.
Indeed, it is futile. Whistleblowers overwhelmingly favor non-hotline channels. Only a
tiny minority-three percent-of corporate whistleblowers bother with hotlines; a whop-
ping ninety-seven percent of whistleblowing is free form.32 The study that confirms this
ninety-seven percent figure was confined to the United States-abroad, where hotlines
are less common and less accepted, the percentage of non-hotline whistleblower reports is
likely even greater. Information-age communications make non-hotline whistleblowing
easier now than ever before. Put aside old, low-tech whistleblowing channels like mailing
a letter, dialing a telephone, slipping a note on someone's chair or under the door, talking
to a news reporter, talking to government authorities, and spreading a rumor. Today's
whistleblower accesses many high-tech channels instantly to transmit denunciations to
anyone-anonymous email accounts, interactive websites, social media, tweets, text
messages, web chat rooms, disposable cell phones, and web-enabled communications. In
today's technology-enabled world, who needs a hotline? Ninety-seven percent of
whistleblowers cannot be wrong.
Historically, hodines always seem to have been mostly irrelevant. Whistleblowing
without a hotline is the time-honored way we denounce our fellows. America's legendary
whistleblowers-the real-life informants immortalized by Hollywood-submitted their
history-making denunciations without hotlines: take, for example, environmental
whistleblower Erin Brockovich (played by Julia Roberts in Erin Brockovich); New York
police whistleblower Frank Serpico (played by Al Pacino in Serpico); Watergate "Deep
Throat" whistleblower Mark Felt (played by Hal Holbrook in All the President's Men);
tobacco industry whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand (played by Russell Crow in The Insider);
Archer-Daniels-Midland whistleblower Mark Whitacre (played by Matt Damon in The
Informant!); Dyncorp/U.N. sex trafficking whistleblower Kathryn Bolkovac (derivative
character played by Rachel Weisz in The Whistleblower); Nigeria "Yellowcake"
whistleblower Joseph Wilson, husband of Valerie Plame (played by Sean Penn in Fair
Game); Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins (star of the documentary Enron: The
Smartest Guys in the Room); Bernie Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolos (star of the
documentary Chasing Madoff)-even Oval Office sex-scandal whistleblower Linda Tripp
(parodied by John Goodman on Saturday Night Live).33 Trailblazing whistleblowers do
not bother with hotlines.
32. "Mhe Ethics Resource Center survey found that only three percent of all reports of wrongdoing come
through hotlines-possibly indicating that employees don't trust them. They might be right: A study by the
University of New Hampshire concluded that corporate officials take anonymous complaints less seriously and
devote fewer resources to them." Dori Meinert, Whistle-Blower: Threat or Asset?, 56 Soc'y HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. 27, 27 (2011) (emphasis added). Of course, though, there is no firm correlation between anonymous
whistleblowing and hotline whistleblowing: anonymous denunciations are submitted all the time through
channels other than hotlines, and self-identifying whistleblowers often call hotlines.
33. Other famous whistleblowers not yet immortalized by Hollywood also made their well-lmown denunci-
ations free form, without resort to formal corporate hotlines. Think of Japan nuclear power whistleblower
Kei Sugaoka; Glaxo Smith Klein whistleblower Cheryl Eckard; "Weinergate" (Anthony Weiner "sexting"
whistleblower scandal) whistleblower Andrew Breitbart; and tobacco industry whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand.
Indeed, workplace whistleblowers denounce errant employees every day without resorting to formal company
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To Americans, imposing laws to restrict hotlines seems downright quixotic for two rea-
sons. First, hotlines exist to support compliance with the government's own laws. Sec-
ond, restricting hotline listeners without bothering whistleblower speakers is both
counterintuitive and futile when ninety-seven percent of whistleblowers avoid hotlines
anyway. But this is just a U.S. perspective. For whatever reason, jurisdictions worldwide
do regulate workplace whistleblower hotlines, using six separate categories of laws. Mul-
tinationals launching cross-border report channels need to comply.
II. Part Two: Complying with the Six Categories of Laws that Restrict
Whistleblower Hotlines Around the World
The raison d'etre of any whistleblower hotline is compliance. Because hotlines coax wit-
nesses to reveal otherwise-clandestine wrongdoing so an employer can investigate, right
wrongs, and comply with law,34 no hotline can afford to violate applicable law. Reductio ad
absurdum: an informant could contact a non-compliant report channel, announce the hot-
line itself violates some law, and denounce the in-house project team that launched it. So
every compliant multinational that launches international hotlines needs to start by check-
ing, in each affected jurisdiction, whether the channel might break the law. Then the
multinational must comply. Because U.S. domestic laws tend not to restrict whistleblower
hotlines, the issues here seem obscure to U.S. multinationals. The rest of this article
analyzes the six categories of laws that can restrict whistleblower hotlines abroad, focusing
on compliance. 35
A. CATEGORY # 1: LAWS MANDATING WHISTLEBLOWER PROCEDURES
The first category of hotline-regulating laws comprises mandates that require setting up
whistleblower hotlines in the first place. 36 These laws even reach an organization already
hotlines. One random, recent example appears in a 2011 California court opinion, San Diego Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1454 (2011). In that case an anonymous
whistleblower denounced, to police-not using any in-house hotline-a middle-school public teacher who
had posted pornographic photographs of himself, and had solicited sex, on Craigslist. Id. The California
court upheld the firing of the teacher even though the public-sector employee's Craigslist advertisement had
been posted off-hours and was unconnected to his classroom job, and even though the denunciation had been
anonymous. Id.
34. A hotline is never necessary for whistleblowing: any whistleblower can submit even anonymous tips in
plenty of ways without a hotline. Indeed, only three percent of whistleblowers bother with hotlines. See, e.g.,
Meinert, supra note 32.
35. These six categories are the categories of laws that regulate the launch and operation of a whistleblower
hotline itself. As such, they do not reach-and this article does not address-legal issues ancillary to hotline
launch and operation. For example, it does not address either laws regulating the launch of a global code of
conduct or laws regulating a mandatory reporting rule that forces employee witnesses to report wrongdoing.
This author has addressed both of those issues elsewhere. As to laws regulating the launch of a global code of
conduct, see generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Code of Conduct Toolkit: Drafting and Launching a Multinational
Employer's Global Code of Conduct, in GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENr LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAw-
YER 563-77 (Andrew P. Morriss & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2010). For discussion of laws regulating a
mandatory reporting rule that forces employee witnesses to report wrongdoing, see Dowling SOX, supra note
4, at 6, 17, 44-45.
36. For this article's definition of "hotline," see supra notes 1, 21. Hotline-mandating laws promote work-
place hotlines and so these laws exist only in whistleblowing-friendly jurisdictions.
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committed to launch a hotline, because any report channel rolled out where the law re-
quires hotlines must comply with the strictures in the hotline-mandating law. This sec-
ton first addresses the U.S. hotline mandating law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
[SOX],37 then looks at similar mandates overseas.
1. SOX § 301
For multinationals that raise funds on U.S. stock exchanges, the vital hotline-mandating
law is SOX § 301(4), which forces company board audit committees to offer "employees"
"procedures" for the "confidential, anonymous" submission of "complaints" and "con-
cerns" of "accounting or auditing matters." 38 The Dodd-Frank law of 2010, discussed in
subsection B(2), amends many parts of SOX but does not tweak this particular mandate.39
SOX § 301(4) requires audit committees of SOX-regulated corporations, including so-
called "foreign private issuers" based outside the United States, to:
establish procedures for: (A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received
by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters;
and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.40
Fortunately, any viable hotline likely complies if only because SOX § 301(4) offers sig-
nificant leeway in structuring "complaints" "procedures."4 1 Congress wanted audit com-
mittees to tailor bespoke report "procedures" to fit each company's own needs, and so the
U.S. SEC refuses to "mandat[e] specific [hotline] procedures." 42 Any robust
whistleblower channel that a SOX-regulated employer communicates to its (at least U.S.)
employees likely complies with SOX § 301(4)(B) as long as employees know about it and
can access it "confidential[ly] and "anonymous[1y]."4 3 Structuring a SOX-compliant hot-
line is so easy that no one ever seems to have gotten it wrong: as of mid-2011, no SOX
§ 301(4) prosecution had ever been reported. Compliance may be so simple that most
"complaints" "procedures" comply with SOX § 301(4).
But the concern here is the global context: how can a multinational launch a compliant
hotline for whistleblowers overseas? The international dimension slams the otherwise-
37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 301 (codified at 15 USC 78j-1)
[hereinafter SOX]. SOX reaches all entities, be they U.S.-based or foreign private issuers, that raise funds on
U.S. stock exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.
38. Id. § 301(4). This part of the article addresses the SOX hotline mandate that audit committees make
"procedures" available to "employees." Separate provisions in SOX impose additional rules as to "reasonably"
'promoting" whistleblowing reports by "senior financial officers" and "attorneys." See id. §§ 307, 406, 407;
17 C.F.R. § 205.3. This article does not address those mandates because here the focus is on broad-based
whistleblower hotline procedures available to all employees (and even to non-employee stakeholders).
39. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (whistleblower bounty provision), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 et seq.).
40. SOX, supra note 37, § 301(4) (emphasis added).
41. SOX § 301 does not use the word "hotline." See id. § 301. This article's definition of "hotline" in-
cludes any "complaints" "procedure" that complies with SOX § 301(4). See supra notes 1, 21.
42. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 19. See also Dowling SOX, supra
note 4, at 6, n. 17.
43. SOX, supra note 37, § 301(4). SOX § 301(4) offers almost no guidance as to what hotline "procedures"
must be, except that the text of § 301(4) requires a report channel be "confidential" and "anonymous." Id.
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straightforward § 301(4) "procedures" mandate into hotline-restrictive barriers, erected
overseas to hold hotlines back.44 The question might therefore become: to what extent can
a SOX-regulated audit committee modify a § 301(4) hotline protocol to conform to overseas laws
restricting hotlines? But that question assumes SOX § 301(4) steps beyond U.S. soil and
confronts hotline-restrictive laws abroad. Notwithstanding a widespread belief and a 2003
statement by the U.S. SEC to the contrary, 45 SOX § 301(4) might be a shut-in. If SOX
§ 301 does not travel overseas, then a hotline launched abroad is free to conform to any
local hotline rules that foreign law might impose. And so our actual question is: does the
SOX § 301(4) "complaints" "procedures" mandate reach extraterritorially?
Perhaps it does not. U.S. statutes apply only domestically unless they specify other-
wise. 46 Nothing in SOX, nor in any SOX regulation or reported case,47 addresses whether
§ 301(4)(B) reaches "employees" based outside the United States. This statutory silence
may anchor § 301(4) to U.S. soil.48 In Carnero v. Boston Scientific, the U.S. First Circuit
Court of Appeals (later confirmed with a U.S. Supreme Court denial of certiorari) con-
fined a different SOX whistleblowing provision-SOX § 806, which prohibits
whistleblower retaliation-to the United States, reasoning that the text is silent as to over-
seas reach. 49 SOX § 301(4) is also silent on that issue, so the Carnero analysis might com-
pel a similar result and confine § 301(4) to the United States. Fresh support lies in the
2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision Morrison v. Nat'lAust. Bank Ltd.,s0 which is eight years
newer than SOX. Morrison anchors § 10(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934-
like SOX, also a securities law-to the United States:
It is a "longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States." . .. When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none . . . . On its face, § 10(b) [U.S. securities law] contains noth-
44. See Chart, infra Part II(C) (summarizing European hotline laws).
45. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 19.
46. The general, long-standing canon of statutory construction, upheld by a number of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, is that U.S. statutes do not apply extraterritorially unless they expressly say they reach
abroad.
47. As of mid-2011, a search revealed no case law or other authority on this point.
48. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 7-11.
49. Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2006). Accord Villanueva v. Core Labs., Docket
No. 09-108 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 22, 2011). But cf O'Mahoney v. Accenture, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10600
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (distinguishing the facts of Carnero). As to the factual distinction between Carnero and
O'Mahoney, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 8-9, n.29. After Carnero, Dodd-Frank § 929A amended SOX
§ 806 to expand the definition of entity to include "any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is
included in the consolidated financial statement." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. 1841 (2010). This would seem to include foreign-incorpo-
rated affiliates. But the Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX § 806 do not say anything about overseas-based
whistleblowers or wbistleblowing incidents that occur abroad. And so the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendments
probably do not affect the rule in Carnero. But if the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendment is somehow held to
overrule Carnero and extend SOX § 806 abroad, the fact that Dodd-Frank did not similarly amend SOX
§ 301 buttresses the analysis that § 301 does not extend abroad: Congress could have made a Dodd-Frank
§ 929A-like amendment to SOX § 301, but chose not to. On the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendment, see gen-
erally OSHA Docket Number OSHA-2011-0126, RIN 1218-AC53, Procedures for the Handling of Retalia-
tion Complaints under Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended, Interim Final Rule,
Request for Comments, at 5-6.
50. See generally Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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ing to suggest it applies abroad ... In short, there is no affirmative indication in the
[Securities] Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore
conclude that it does not.51
But Morrison is merely the U.S. Supreme Court's view. Multinationals reflexively pre-
sume, following an aging 2003 SEC comment with a fleeting reference to § 301 hotlines
in "different jurisdictions," 52 that the SOX hotline "procedures" mandate extends world-
wide. SOX-regulated multinationals may not even care whether SOX § 301 reaches
abroad-even if it does not, they aspire to the "gold standard" of a SOX-compliant confi-
dential, anonymous hotline across operations worldwide, regardless of whether it sparks a
conflict with hotline-restricting laws abroad.
2. Beyond SOX § 301
Abroad, whistleblower hotlines must comply with strictures in foreign laws that, like
SOX § 301, require employee report channels.ss But these laws are rare. As of 2011, very
few laws beyond SOX force employers to offer hotlines. "Whistleblower laws" have pop-
ped up worldwide, but they tend to be mere retaliation prohibitions, stopping employers
from punishing whistleblowers whether they use hotlines or not.5 4 For example, the UK
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998,ss India's Limited Liability Partnership Act 2008,56
Japan's Whistleblower Protection Act,57 and South Africa's Protected Disclosures Act
2000 contain whistleblower retaliation prohibitions without affirmatively requiring report
channels.ss Anti-fraud securities laws tend not to require hotlines either. Japan's Finan-
cial Instruments and Exchange Law (J-SOX) does not require them,59 nor do UK financial
accountability laws or the UK Bribery Act. 60 Legislatures in a few jurisdictions recommend
whistleblower hotlines-India's clause 49 of the Listing Agreementl and Spain's Recom-
51. Id. at 2877-78, 2881, 2883 (emphasis added). After Morrison, Dodd-Frank § 929P, amended part of the
securities law at issue (§ 17 (a) of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933) so that that law now expressly reaches
abroad. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P. But nothing in Dodd-
Frank or elsewhere extends SOX § 301(4) abroad, and the § 929P amendment does not affect the jurispru-
dence of Morrison.
52. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 19.
53. Just as, for example, SOX § 301 imposes the stricture that report "procedures" be "confidential [and]
anonymous." See SOX, supra note 37, § 301(4).
54. See infra Part II(E) for discussion of whistleblower retaliation laws.
55. See generally Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23 (Eng.).
56. Limited Liability Partner Act, 2008, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2009 (India), available at http://www.lp.
gov.in/.
57. Act No. 122 of 2004 (apan).
58. Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (Cape Town) (S. Afr.). Section 6(2) addresses, but does not
mandate, voluntarily-adopted "procedure[s] authorised by [an] employer." Id. § 6(2).
59. Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Acts No. 65, 66 of 2006 (Japan).
60. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.).
61. Limited Liability Partner Act, 2008, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2009 (India); Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Bd. of India, Extension of Date of Ensuring Compliance with Revised Clause 49 of the Listing Agree-
ment (Mar. 29, 2005) (establishing an effective date of Dec. 31, 2005 for compliance with clause 49 of the
Limited Liability Partner Act).
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mendation 50.1(d), part II of Codigo Unificado de Buen Gobierno 19 May 2006.62 But com-
panies can and do ignore these. 63
A few isolated laws in a handful of places require or have required employers to sponsor
report channels. Liberia Executive Order # 22 of 2009,64 issued by Liberia's Nobel Peace
Prize-winning president, required "private entities" to launch procedures for "receiving
and processing" "public interest disclosures" about private company "malpractices." 65 But
that order has now lapsed. Norway's Working Environment Act 66 grants Norwegians a
right to report "censurable conditions" and urges employers to "establish" some "rou-
tin[e] . .. or ... other measures" for employee whistleblower reports. 67 But this is quali-
fied and little more than a strong recommendation. Multinationals launching cross-
border whistleblower hotlines must adapt report channels to strictures in local hotline
mandates like the now-lapsed Liberia order and Norway's Working Environment Act.
But beyond U.S. SOX, few laws yet require hotlines, although this might be an emerging
trend.
B. CATEGORY # 2: LAWs PROMOTING DENUNCIATIONs To GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITIES
Requirements of whistleblower procedures aside, our next category of hotline regula-
tion is laws like U.S. Dodd-Frank68 that promote employee/stakeholder denunciations to
government authorities. These laws do not regulate company hotlines per se, but they steer
employer hotline strategy for two reasons: first, encouraging whistleblowing to govern-
ment competes with employer hotlines by enticing internal whistleblowers to divert de-
nunciations from company compliance experts and over to outside law enforcers who
indict white-collar criminals. Second, laws that require (as opposed merely to encourage)
government denunciations rarely except corporate hotline sponsors. These laws therefore
force hotline sponsors to divulge hotline allegations to law enforcement. For both rea-
sons, hotline sponsors need strategies accounting for these laws. We address U.S. Dodd-
Frank first, then similar laws elsewhere.
62. CODIGO UNIFICADO DE BUEN GOBIERNO [REPORT OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GRouP ON THE
GOOD GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES] recommendation 50.1(d), part II, CNMV (2006), available at
http://objetivol5.net/doc/CNMVCodigoBuenGobiernoDeLasSociedadesCotizadas.pdf (Spanish version)
(Spain); see also Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 15, n.48.
63. This part addresses laws mandating general denunciations to government authorities. In the specific
area of sexual harassment, there are some other laws in some jurisdictions like Costa Rica that require em-
ployers to offer a report channel specifically for sex harassment complaints. Other countries affirmatively
require employers to investigate specific allegations of sex harassment; those countries include Chile, India,
Japan, South Africa, and Venezuela. Colombia requires some report channel for "labor" harassment.
64. Exec. Order 22 of 2009 (signed by Liberia President (2011 Nobel Peace Prize winner) Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf in Dec. 2009; order now lapsed) (Liber.).
65. Id.
66. Working Environment Act, No. 10 (2007) (Nor.), available at http://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/binfll/
download2.php?tid=92156; see alo Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 15, n.48 (discussing the Working Environ-
ment Act).
67. Norwegian Act, supra note 66.
68. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (whistleblower bounty provision), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 et seq.).
WINTER 2011
916 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
1. U.S. Dodd-Frank
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 amended
Sarbanes-Oxley in many key respects, but did not touch SOX § 301(4)'s mandate for hot-
line/"complaints" "procedures." 69 Rather, Dodd-Frank took a radically different ap-
proach to whistleblowing that ultimately promotes robust internal company hodines for a
completely different reason. Under Dodd-Frank § 92270 and U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission [SEC] implementing rules of May 2011,71 a U.S. government
"bounty" pays cash awards of ten percent to thirty percent of SEC-recovered sanctions
over $1 million to eligible whistleblowers-whether living stateside or abroad72-who
told the SEC "original information" about securities violations leading to an actual money
recovery.73 Even whistleblowers that bypass internal SOX § 301 hotlines are eligible.
Dodd-Frank's lure of a huge payday may tempt whistleblowers more than even the warm
feeling of doing the right thing by calling an in-house SOX hotline.74 The Wall Street
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Adopting Release, Implementation of Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Rel. No. 34-64545 (May 25, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
72. Cf Tammy Marzigliano & Jordan A. Thomas, Advocacy & Counsel for the SEC Whistleblower: A Primer
for Employment Lawyers, 196 DLR I-1, 1-2 (2011):
Any violation of the federal securities laws qualifies for protection under Dodd-Frank. The re-
ported violation may have occurred anywhere in the world, involving public or private organiza-
tions and domestic or international violators. In most cases, securities fraud occurs when
manipulative and deceptive practices are employed in connection with the purchase and sale of a
security. Beyond stocks and bonds, the federal securities laws have interpreted "security" broadly
to include investment contracts, notes, and other nontraditional investments.
(emphasis added).
73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 68, at § 922(a); see also
Adopting Release, supra note 71. SEC Enforcement Division Associate Director Stephen L. Cohen, speaking
at a conference in November 2011, said that critics of the bounty program "warned," "individuals [would]
see[k] financial awards under the program, which by statute will be no less than $100,000 and could reach into the
millions of dollars." Joyce, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added). The Dodd-Frank bounty is payable only for
disclosing a violation of U.S. securities laws-not, for example, for disclosing bribery that violates the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note
68, at §§ 21F(a)(1), (b)(1). That said, though, "[slome whistleblowers may not distinguish between the securi-
ties laws and [other laws like] the FCPA. . . and once the SEC has received a tip, it can be expected to pass it
on to other law enforcement authorities." Larry P. Ellsworth, Blowing the Whistle on Private Cos.?, Employ-
ment Law 360, LAw360.com (Oct. 26, 2011). Whistleblowers resident outside the United States who sus-
pect a violation of U.S. securities laws (such as related to accounting fraud occurring overseas) appear to be
fully eligible for the bounty.
74. Cf Marzigliano & Thomas, supra note 72:
Dodd-Frank not only provides robust whistleblower protection, but it has revived pre-existing
whistleblower claims. The False Claims Act (FCA), once limited to individuals who were "origi-
nal sources" with "direct and independent knowledge," has been expanded to cover individuals
with either information or analysis . . . . Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) now appears to
have the teeth it was intended to have. Dodd-Frank expanded SOX by extending coverage be-
yond just public companies to employees of affiliates and subsidiaries of publicly traded compa-
nies "whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such
publicly traded company."
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Journal and many others lament the discordant policy message here to would-be
whistleblowers. 75
Former Deputy U.S. Attorney General George Terwilliger, now a partner practicing
white-collar criminal law at White & Case LLP in Washington D.C., analyzes the conflict
here in detail and offers strategic advice to corporations caught between SOX and Dodd-
Frank. Terwilliger's analysis merits setting out in detail:
Notably omitted from the [SEC Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty] Final Rules are
requirements that were suggested and designed to preserve the effectiveness of [SOX
§ 301-style] corporate internal reporting systems. The Final Rules provide what the
SEC posits are a number of incentives to encourage potential whistleblowers to util-
ize existing internal reporting systems. However, an individual with access to a well-
structured, staffed, and responsive internal reporting system can nonetheless forgo reporting
internally, provide information directly to the SEC, and remain eligible for [a bounty] award.
The SEC has downplayed the likelihood that individuals seeking awards will bypass
internal systems, but the program's first-to-report requirement, enormous potential finan-
cial awards, and lack of an internal reporting requirement represent a significant challenge to
maintaining effective compliance programs [including an effective internal hotline]. Compa-
nies have implemented these very compliance programs, often at great expense, at the
behest of federal authorities and the dictates of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements to ef-
fectively monitor corporate operations for compliance with law.
Companies now need to assess the effect of the whistleblower reward provision of Dodd-Frank
and the SEC's implementing rules on their compliance programs and consider such program-
matic adjustments and changes as that assessment may suggest.76
75. According to a Wall St. Journal blog article:
Compliance lawyers and general counsel argue that they've spent much of the past decade putting
compliance programs into place to deal with whistleblowing complaints; letting every disgruntled
employee run to the SEC would provide huge headaches and little benefit .... David Becker, the SEC's
general counsel, recently told a group ... that whistleblowers should not have to approach their compa-
nies' management before they run to the SEC .. . Becker said the reason is because some compliance
programs "no matter how elaborately conceived and extensively documented, exist only on paper.
Some small number are shams."
Ashby Jones, Sympathy for the Whistleblower? SEC GC's Comments Pique Interest, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Feb. 1,
2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/01/sympathy-for-the-whistleblower-sec-gcs-comments-pique-in-
terest/.
Many later commentators offered similar views during 2011. See, e.g., BNA Daily Labor Report, Lawyers
Stress Whistleblower Protections in Dodd-Frank Act and SOX Amendments, 112 DLR C-1 (June 10, 2011);
Corpedia Ask the Experts, What Should a Company's Response Be to the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
Which Encourage Employees to Report Wrong-Doing to the SEC?, CORNPEDIA ONLINF, Aug. 2, 2011; Ellsworth,
supra note 73; Gregory, supra note 9; Meinert, supra note 32; David Schwartz & Kathiana Aurelien,
Whistleblowing: Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounties and Their Impact on Employers, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS:
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, vol. 5 no. 42, at 14 (Oct. 24, 2011); Sutherland Whistleblower Response Team,
http://www.regulatoryreformtaskforce.com/whistleblowerresponseteam/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2011); George
J. Terwilliger HI, SEC Adopts Final Rules to Implement New Whistleblower Program, METROPOLITAN Cop.
CouNs., July 1, 2011. For the opposite point of view-Dodd-Frank's whistleblowing scheme as it looks to
counsel for employee whistleblowers-see Marzigliano & Thomas, supra note 72.
76. Terwilliger, supra note 75 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Terwilliger adds:
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The final SEC rules implementing the bounty attempted, at least ostensibly, to accom-
modate the critics. According to Terwilliger:
The SEC's release accompanying its Final Rules identifies three incentives in the
Final Rules to encourage individuals to report potential misconduct to internal [hot-
line] systems, or at least minimize the incentive for individuals to bypass internal
reporting systems in the hope of qualifying for an award. First, a whistleblower's
voluntary participation or interference with a corporate compliance program may in-
crease or decrease the award for that whistleblower. Second, if an individual reports
information internally that .. . leads to a successful enforcement action, the SEC will
give the whistleblower "full credit" for information disclosed by the corporation for
purposes of determining the individual's eligibility for and amount of an award.
Third, if a whistleblower reports information internally and within 120 days, reports
that same information to the SEC, the SEC will consider the initial date of internal
disclosure as the effective date for purposes of determining the whistleblower's eligi-
bility for an award.77
But to Terwilliger, these three would-be "incentives . . . fall short of the rule-making
options available to the SEC that would ensure internal [hotlines] continue to help com-
panies identify misconduct and provide opportunities to investigate and take appropriate
remedial actions:"
It seems apparent that the SEC made a policy choice that places greater importance
on its enforcement interests than on maximizing the continued effectiveness of inter-
nal reporting systems and the compliance programs they support. For its part, the
SEC "expects that in appropriate cases . . . it will, upon receiving a [bounty-eligible]
whistleblower complaint, contact a company .. . and give the company an opportu-
nity to investigate the matter and report back." While one can hope this positive
[SEC] Commissioner Paredes stated: "singular attention has centered on the extent to which the
[Dodd-Frank] whistleblower [bounty] program, depending on how it is structured, could unduly
erode the value of internal compliance programs in rooting out and preventing wrongdoing."
Despite the advocacy for an internal reporting requirement as a condition of award eligibility, the
SEC declined to incorporate such a requirement in the final rules.
77. Id. (footnotes omitted). According to David Schwartz and Kathiana Aurelien of the law firm Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP:
Even though employers do not pay bounties directly to whistleblowers, many employers are
rightly concerned that they will now be subject to unnecessary SEC investigations as employees
start to view bounties as personal "lottery tickets." If a few employees "hit it big," more complaints
to the SEC will follow, whether or not they are well-founded.
Schwartz & Aurelien, supra note 75, at 14 (emphasis added); see also Gregory, supra note 9, at 20-22:
The [Dodd-Frank] rules pose a potential risk to the effectiveness of corporate compliance pro-
grams, which by their nature depend on reports from employees about potential wrongdoing.
The split 3-2 SEC vote adopting the rules underscores the controversy about the potential impact
of the rules on [company compliance] programs .... A new Office of the Whistleblower has been
established within the SEC's Division of Enforcement to administer the rules. . . . [The rules]
address concerns that compliance programs will be undermined if employees go directly to the
SEC with information about potential wrongdoing.. . . The new rules may have a detrimental
effect on existing internal reporting systems.
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policy statement will describe a normative practice excepted only in outlier cases
where the business ... in question bears hallmarks of a criminal enterprise, the SEC's
actual practice under its whistleblower rules merits continued attention, including
through congressional oversight.
The new whistleblower program provides good cause for corporations to evaluate
their compliance efforts and take steps to encourage employees to use internal reporting
systems and ensure that companies are made aware of compliance issues as soon as
possible.
The objectives of such reevaluation should include (a) maximizing the effectiveness of
internal reporting systems; (b) ensuring that internal reports are thoroughly evaluated
by a person or group with sufficiently comprehensive knowledge to recognize poten-
tial compliance issues in reports that are misdirected or incomplete; and (c) re-exam-
ining policies and practices concerning the dissemination of information regarding
potential compliance issues within a corporation ....
Corporations may also want to consider renewed efforts to inform or remind employ-
ees about the existence and use of internal [hotline] reporting systems and provide
additional training concerning such use. Employees must believe that reporting in-
ternally will not negatively impact theirjob status. Where appropriate, examples of suc-
cessful internal reporting offer the best evidence to employees that internal reporting
is in the best interest of both the employees and the corporation.
Corporations should also evaluate, assess, and update compliance programs to ensure that
internal complaints are handled swiftly and, where appropriate, lead to investigations,
remediation and disciplinary measures. Such efforts are, of course, necessary to pro-
tect shareholder value and mitigate liability if misconduct does occur, as the SEC will
continue to consider cooperation efforts by companies in accordance with . . . SEC
policies that reward such efforts.78
Despite the stark policy clash between SOX § 301 and the Dodd-Frank bounty, at the
end of the day both laws push company hotline strategy in the very same direction: SOX
requires an employer to offer internal hotline "procedures" while Dodd-Frank motivates
78. Terwilliger,supra note 75 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). For other analyses broadly consistent
with Terwilliger's, see citations supra note 75. According to HR Magazine:
To reduce the risk of an expensive and embarrassing government investigation [following up on a
Dodd Frank whistleblower's call], company leaders must step up internal reporting procedures
and management training to encourage employees to report their concerns to the company first,
lawyers say. . . . Corporate lawyers argue that the proposed [Dodd-Frank] regulations would
entice disgruntled employees to circumvent internal reporting methods with the goal of getting
hefty rewards.
Meinert, supra note 32, at 28. According to Skadden, Arps commentators:
The final rules do not require employees to report suspected violations using internal compliance
mechanism to qualify for a bounty. Although the lack of a requirement to report internally creates
a huge incentive for employees to go directly to the government, the SEC attempted to encourage
compliance with internal reporting systems by counting it as a factor when determining the
amount of the bounty.
Schwartz & Aurelien, supra note 75, at 15 (emphasis added).
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the very same thing-a conspicuous internal report channel robust enough to attract de-
nunciations that informants might otherwise report to government enforcers.79
2. Beyond Dodd-Frank
Laws outside the United States also regulate whistleblower denunciations to local gov-
ernment enforcers. Any multinational launching a global hotline needs to account for
these if only because they rarely exempt hotline sponsors themselves and require compa-
nies to disclose hotline denunciations over to local law enforcement. Yet these laws are
rare in the free world. The Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010, as one
example, encourages whistleblowing with a vague Dodd-Frank-like bounty.80 Now-
lapsed Liberia Executive Order # 22 used to encourage whistleblowing to the government
in a few ways.81 But both these laws and even U.S. Dodd-Frank merely promote denounc-
ing wrongdoers to government. They pose no compliance challenge to companies
launching and staffing internal hotlines, although they motivate multinationals to promote
report channels robust enough to attract denunciations that might otherwise go to law
enforcers.
The tougher compliance and hotline administration issue here is laws that require di-
vulging evidence of criminal behavior to government enforcers. Because few, if any,
mandatory-reporting laws exempt hotline sponsors, these laws require divulging credible
hotline reports to law enforcers even before a thorough internal investigation. Fortunately,
very few free-world jurisdictions impose these laws. Slovakia's Criminal Code, as one
example, forces Slovaks (including employers) who reliably learn of illegal behaviour to
denounce wrongdoers to the police. 82 Liberia's now-lapsed Executive Order # 22 forced
employers that received credible criminal allegations through mandatory hotlines to re-
port them to Liberia's "attorney general."83 These laws cripple hotline strategy both be-
cause they require organizations to use their hotlines to incriminate themselves and
because they limit organizations' power to investigate denunciations.84
79. See citations supra note 75. While to a self-interested whistleblower an internal hotline may not ever
look as attractive as the Dodd-Frank cash bounty, employers are in a special position for keeping their hot-
lines in front of employees worldwide. The U.S. SEC does not communicate directly with U.S. workforces,
much less overseas workforces.
80. Act 711, effective Dec. 15, 2010, at art. 26 (Malay) (government can pay "rewards" to whistleblowers),
available at http://www.bheuu.gov.my/pdf/Akta/Act%2071 l.pdf; cf id. at art. 18(2)() (whistleblower can win
"pain and suffering" award).
81. Exec. Order 22 of 2009 (signed by Liberia President (2011 Nobel Peace Prize winner) Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf in Dec. 2009; order now lapsed) (Liber.).
82. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing Law of the National Council of the Slovak Republic
No. 300 (2005) Coll. Penal Code (section 340/failure to report a criminal offense)).
83. Liberia Executive Order # 22 of 2009, supra note 64.
84. See generally Dowling Investigations, supra note 9. Hotline communications are usually worded to in-
vite reports of violations of both criminal law and of company policy; laws that require reporting to police
obviously affect only whistleblower denunciations of criminals, not denunciations of mere policy violators.
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C. CATEGORY # 3: LAWs RESTRiCTING HOTLN1Es SPECIFICALLY (EU DATA
PROTECTION LAWS)
Having discussed laws that both require whistleblower hotlines and promote
whistleblowing to government, our next category is hotline mandates that run completely
in the opposite direction and restrict organizations' freedom to launch and operate report
channels.ss In theory, this category includes all laws that specifically ban or limit
whistleblower hotlines, but no such laws are known to exist anywhere. Rather, the only
known laws specifically restricting employer whistleblower report procedures are Euro-
pean Union member state guidelines interpreting EU data protection (privacy) laws in the
hotline context. 6
Some Continental Europeans distrust whistleblowers and hotlines. 87 Over a dozen Eu-
ropean jurisdictions interpret their local domestic data protection laws (either by regula-
tion or at least by data agency pronouncement) specifically to rein in employer hotlines,
In addition, an EU advisory body called the Article 29 Working Party issued a persuasive
but non-binding report that recommends all twenty-seven EU states embrace a particu-
larly restrictive interpretation of EU data law to rein in hotlines. 5 Broadly speaking,
Europeans see hodines as threatening privacy rights of denounced targets and witnesses
when hotlines are not "proportionate" to other report channels in European workplaces.89
85. We do not include here in "Category #3" whistleblower retaliation laws because those laws do not reach
the launch and operation of whistleblower hotlines. Rather, whistleblower retaliation laws regulate retaliatory
acts against whistleblowers who have already denounced suspected wrongdoers, whether or not they had used
a hotline to do it. We address whistleblower retaliation laws separately, infra at Part Two, "Category #5."
86. See EU Data Privacy Directive, directive 95/46/EC (Oct. 1995) (discussing what EU data protection
laws are); see e.g., Dowling & Mittman, supra note 16; and see generally Whiutman, supra note 7.
87. Supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
88. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 18-56 (summarizing (far more thoroughly than the discussion infra)
these European hotline restrictions); see also Chart, infra Part m; Daniel Cooper & Helena Marttila, Corporate
Whistleblowing Hotlines and EU Data Protection Laws, PLC ONLINE, http://ipandit.practicallaw.com/1-366-
2987.
89. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 41-42 (on "proportionality" in the hotline context); Continental
Europeans insist that a hotline is not "proportionate" (is redundant, unnecessary, or at least "overkill") if it
threatens to compromise data rights of denounced targets and others but offers little benefit beyond simply
duplicating alternate, more privacy-protective report channels already in the European workplace. These so-
called "alternate report channels" are not hotlines, of course, but rather are local employee representatives
(trade unions, works councils, health and safety committees, ombudsmen), local grievance procedures, and
local line managers/chain of command/human resources. To an American, though, these are not adequate
"alternates" at all. An American sees local representatives/processors/managers as insiders incompetent to
substitute for a hotline for two reasons: (1) reporting to local representatives/processors/managers tends to
be neither confidential nor anonymous (although it can be both); and (2) local representatives/processors/
managers are rarely both neutral and able to field potentially-explosive denunciations about their own local
team or their own local office/plant/operation. An informant making a scandalous accusation to a local repre-
sentative/processor/manager could step into internal company politics or sensitive personal relationships and
the denunciation might go nowhere. Even a local representative/processor/manager not intending to bury an
allegation might be too distracted to appreciate its gravity or too busy or untrained to ask the right follow-up
questions, or else communication lines might break down. For many reasons, headquarters might never hear
about the denunciation or might not get an accurate version. These problems are not just theoretical or
hypothetical; denunciations to local interested insiders are mishandled all the time. For example, in October
2011 a California jury awarded a Sears employee $5.2 million in a race harassment case that emerged from
this very scenario. Loretta Kalb, Sears Employee Wins $5.2 Million Jury Award for Racial Harassment, SACRA-
MENTO (CA.) CrIv NEWS, Oct. 26, 2011. The Sears employee had approached his "supervisors" denouncing
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Among the specific hurdles that European jurisdictions erect to frustrate hotlines, perhaps
the four biggest are: (1) restrictions against hotlines accepting anonymous denunciations;
(2) limits on the universe of "proportionate" infractions on which a hotline accepts denun-
ciations; (3) limits on who can use a hotline and be denounced by hotline; and (4) hotline
registration requirements. This article discusses each in turn.
1. Restrictions Against Hotlines Accepting Anonymous Denunciations
European hostility toward whistleblowing runs fiercest against anonymous denuncia-
tions90 and hotlines that accept them. Spain and Portugal ban anonymous hotline denun-
ciations entirely and France may prohibit (or at least has prohibited) employers from
disclosing that a hotline will accept anonymous calls, even if it does in fact take them.91
Hotline communications across the rest of Continental Europe should affirmatively dis-
courage anonymous calls and affirmatively encourage informants to self-identify. Mul-
tinationals that see SOX § 301(4)'s mandate for "anonymous procedures" as reaching
overseas face an impossible conundrum, at least in Spain and Portugal, and possibly in
France. 92
Employers that think they must reconcile U.S.-style SOX hotlines with European ano-
nymity restrictions have four possible choices, not all fully compliant: (1) violate Spanish,
Portuguese, and maybe French law by offering and communicating a hotline that accepts
anonymous calls; (2) keep hotline communications silent on anonymity but let hotline
staff accept denunciations from informants who refuse to self-identify, even where that
violates local law; (3) issue a hotline communication that discourages but implicitly accepts
anonymous denunciations even where this violates local law; or (4) have hotline staff hang
up on anonymous callers where required under local law, taking the position that the SOX
§ 301 "anonym[ity]" requirement does not reach abroad.
Deciding among these four options forces a multinational to ponder whether to locally
tailor hotline communications abroad or to do what every American multinational would
likely prefer-issue a single global hotline protocol for affiliate employees worldwide, or
at least Europe-wide. This requires tough decisions. How can a global intranet send
different messages to employees in different countries? If a hotline sponsor can post
a racist colleague who happened to be "one of [Sears's] top sales producers nationally." Id. The "supervi-
sors," "not want[ing] to take action" against the racist sales star, covered up the denunciation and took "subse-
quent acts . . . to avoid being exposed for failing to follow the law." Id. A jury awarded $5.2 million to the
victim. Id. The Sears case shows that what Europeans call "alternate" internal "report channels" do not
really mimic whistleblower hotlines because they are not disinterested. To Americans, the European "pro-
portionality" argument in the report channel context fundamentally misunderstands what workplace
whistleblower hotlines are designed to do. A hotline, to an American, gives retaliation-fearing informants a
way around interested local players who might be less concerned with "making it right" than with "making the
numbers"-Americans see a hotline as a detour around, not a duplicate of, local internal "report channels."
See infra note 95.
90. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. In the United States, by contrast, champions of corporate
compliance and social responsibility tend to trust anonymous report channels, reasoning that anonymity en-
courages reluctant whistleblowers.
91. See Chart infra Part m (citing to these laws in Spain, Portugal, and France).
92. See supra notes 18, 50-54 (SOX-regulated multinationals widely believe that SOX § 301(4) extends
"extraterritorially" to workforces outside the United States even if the 2010 Morrison U.S. Supreme Court
decision does not support this belief.
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country-tailored hotline protocols on its company intranet, what happens if an employee
based in one-country accesses and follows a protocol for staff in a different country?
What if an informant from a country where the employer purports not to accept anony-
mous calls offers up a huge denunciation but refuses to self-identify-must hotline staff
cut off his report? At this level of granularity, these are strategy questions; answers de-
pend on circumstances, risk analysis, and HR communication systems specific to each
organization. 93
2. Limits on the Universe of "Proportionate" Infractions on Which a Hotline Accepts
Denunciations
Even the most hotline-skeptical jurisdictions in Europe recognize, grudgingly, that U.S.
multinationals feel compelled to offer employee hotlines to collect reports of financial/
audit/accounting fraud and bribery/improper payments, to comply at least with the spirit
of U.S. SOX and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 94 Hotline-skeptical jurisdic-
tions in Europe interpret data protection laws to allow only "proportionate" workplace
hotlines closed off to all but these few infractions.95 But U.S. multinationals see no reason
to restrict hotlines this way. They prefer to throw open hotlines to most any impropriety.
After all, Americans reason, if we go through the trouble of launching and staffing a hot-
line, we might as well use it to find out about any problem out there, be it an environmen-
tal spill, workplace harassment and bullying, vandalism, corporate espionage, breach of
HR policy, breach of expense reimbursement protocols-even theft of office supplies, and
unsanitary use of toilets. But to list hotline-reportable infractions is illusory and deceptive
if hotline operators will actually take all calls. Yet an employer faces logistical problems
confining a hotline to only a few topics. How does hotline-answering staff field an off-
point call? Can they even listen? How does hotline staff divert an off-point denunciation
to another channel, without dropping it?
93. These issues lead to real-world litigation. See Benoist Girard (subsidiary of Stryker) v. CHSCT, Cour
d'Appel Caen 3rd Chamber (23 Sept. 11, released 4 Oct. 11) (Fr.) (Holding illegal the France hotline of
Michigan-based medical technology multinational Stryker, even though the French Data Protection Authority had
previously approved it. A French whistleblower had gotten past the approved France-specific communications
and accessed a different on-line hotline communication meant for Stryker U.S. employees.); see also Dowling
SOX, supra note 4, at 51-56 (for a deeper discussion of the strategy issues in play here).
94. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. (The FCPA does not expressly mandate in-house hotlines, but
FCPA compliance without a hotline presents tough challenges. Even EU jurisdictions seem open to hodines
that accept denunciations of bribery); see also Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 30.
95. In short, European jurisdictions see workplace hotlines as a threat to data privacy tolerable only where
absolutely necessary. By European standards a hotline is somehow less objectionable if it collects only allega-
tions of audit/accounting fraud and bribery but not allegations of, say, theft, physical violence, and sexual
harassment. Europeans speak here in terms of "proportionality;" to a European, a hotline that accepts denun-
ciations of thievery, bullying, and sex harassment is not "proportionate" because harassers, bullies, and
thieves, unlike fraudsters and bribers, somehow can be denounced more appropriately via other channels. To
an American, this "proportionality" analysis in the hotline context seems circular, even bizarre. See supra note
89 (on "proportionality").
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3. Limits on Who Can Use a Hotline and be Denounced by It
Some jurisdictions such as Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, and Sweden96 seem oddly
classist and undemocratic because they force employers to reserve hotlines for executives
denouncing misdeeds of upper-level colleagues. These jurisdictions steer low-level staff
to report channels more "proportionate" for their low rank.97 An employer communica-
don closing off a hotline to low-ranking whistleblowers and targets must be explicit. Hot-
line staff must be ready to cut off any low-ranking would-be whistleblower who offers a
compelling denunciation.
4. Hotline Registration Requirements
Many European jurisdictions require hotline sponsors to register hotlines with local
government data-privacy bureaucracies (data protection authorities). These tend to be
general mandates that in effect require data "processors" to declare to data authorities
many various types of "data processing systems"-including Human Resources Informa-
don Systems from payroll and attendance to performance evaluation, pension/benefits,
expense reimbursement, travel tracking, milestone anniversary gift programs, and hot-
lines, too. A few European jurisdictions, such as France,98 go farther and require complex
hotline-specific data agency registrations. France imposes both a hotline "declaration" pro-
cedure and an alternate hotline "authorization" mandate.99
Beyond these four main types of EU data-law hotline restrictions, Europe's hotline-
skeptical jurisdictions regulate other aspects of report channels. Other regulated issues
include: (5) alignment with "proportionate" alternate report channels in the workplace;OO
(6) notices to employees, targets, and witnesses explaining their rights; (7) restrictions
against outsourcing hotlines; (8) communications to targets/witnesses disclosing specific
whistleblower denunciations; (9) complying with "sensitive" (EU Data Directive article 8)
data restrictions as to criminal data received by hotline; (10) rights to access, rectify, block,
or eliminate personal data processed via hotline; (11) restrictions against transferring hot-
line data outside of Europe; and (12) deleting/purging of data in hotline call files.I1 The
chart below summarizes hotline laws in Europe on key topics.
III. Whistleblower Hotlines and Data Protection Laws in Europe
This chart summarizes data-protection law pronouncements in those EU member
states that issued data-law mandates or interpretations specific to employee whistleblower
hotlines as of mid-2011. "Whistleblower hotline" means any channel/system for employ-
ees/stakeholders to submit complaints/concerns/allegations of wrongdoing to
management.
96. See "Sweden" row on Chart and citations therein.
97. See supra notes 89 and 95 (on "proportionality").
98. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 18-56 (sumzarizing European hotline restriction laws); see also
Chart, infra pp. 141-61; Cooper & Marttila, supra note 88.
99. See "France" row on Chart and citations therein.
100. See supra notes 89, 95 (on "proportionality").
101. These twelve issues are discussed at Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 41-51.
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In discussing laws that expressly restrict workplace whistleblower hotlines, this article
discussed only the data protection laws of Europe because those are the only known laws
anywhere that specifically speak to, and restrict, employer whistleblower hotlines. Those
laws present the toughest single compliance challenge to a multinational launching a
cross-border hotline. In particular, France continues to issue cases, regulations, pro-
nouncements, and private letter rulings that regulate hotlines increasingly minutely.
Spain aggressively prohibits anonymous hotlines, and Portugal seems to as well.1112 Ger-
many imposes multi-faceted rules that can differ by Lander (state)."i' So many differing
hotline-specific restrictions across Europe both impose compliance challenges and they
create logistical problems of hotline alignment. Having to tailor disparate local hotlines
frustrates multinationals that invariably would prefer just one single global (or at least one
single European) hotline protocol.0 4
D. CAT'coRy # 4: LAWs PROIBsITING HIllSTLF.BLO\A'lVR RETALIATION
Having addressed laws that mandate workplace whistleblower hotlines, which regulate
denunciations to government authorities and restrict hotlines specifically, this article now
turns to a fourth category of whistleblowing law: prohibitions against whistleblower retali-
ation. These are increasingly common. U.S. SOX105 and Dodd-Frank106 as well as U.S.
102. See "France," "Spain," and "Portugal" rows on Chart and citations therein.
103. See "Germany" row on Chart.
104. Cf Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 53-54 (exploring alternatives of eschewing hotlies altogether or
implementing one global hotline).
105. SOX § 806 offers whistleblowers an administrative, and ultimately a court, claim for retaliation-if the
§ 806 claim in the Canero case (cited and discussed supra note 49 and accompanying text). The U.S. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration handles whistleblower claims in the first instance that allege SOX
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state whistleblower retaliation laws 0 7 grant causes of action to stateside whistleblowers
punished for whistleblowing. Now, more and more overseas jurisdictions, from the
United Kingdom and South Africa to Malaysia, Japan, and beyond have climbed aboard
this bandwagon and prohibited whistleblower retaliation. 08 Indeed, freedom from work-
place whistleblower retaliation has actually been declared a human right, at least in Eu-
rope. In a decision of July 2011 involving Germany, the European Court of Human
Rights allowed all employees to denounce wrongdoing free from the spectre of
retaliation.o9
Vhistleblower retaliation laws are sometimes colloquially called "whistleblower laws,"
and so they might seem to play a role in the launch of a legally-compliant hotline. But for
the most part they do not. These laws are specific to workplace-context whistleblowing,
but in practical effect they have almost nothing to say about hotlines because retaliation is
impossible until after a whistleblower call ends and a follow-up investigatory stage be-
gins.no Retaliation can become an issue only after an employer responds to a would-be
whistleblower.111
That said there is a big hotline communication issue here. In whistleblowing-averse
jurisdictions around the world, from Russia to Latin America and the Middle East to India
and parts of Asia and Africa, an employer needs to overcome worker fear of reprisal for
whistleblowing. This means guaranteeing that no one using the report channel in good
§ 806 violations. OSHA whistleblower-retaliation-handling rules appear at 29 CFR Part 1980. These rules
were being revised in 2011 to accommodate the changes of Dodd-Frank, and a draft revision issued Novem-
ber 3, 2011. OSHA "Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints under Section 806 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended, Interim Final Rule, Request for Comments," supra note 49.
106. Dodd-Frank, supra note 37 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l)(A),(B)); f. Final Rule § 240.21F-
2(b)(2). Dodd-Frank whistleblower retaliation provisions appear at Dodd-Frank § 929, which amends SOX
§ 806 by expanding the statute of limitations significantly, exempting SOX whistleblower claims from
mandatory arbitration, and allowing state court SOX whistleblower retaliation claims to be removed to fed-
eral court and tried before a jury. Dodd-Frank's whistleblower retaliation protections are available to em-
ployees who provide information to the SEC in the manner described in the Final Rules and with a
"reasonable belief that the information being provided relates to a possible securities law violation that has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." Dodd-Frank affords individuals a cause in federal district court to
enforce the new provisions. See also Terwilliger, supra note 75; see SOX § 806, supra note 105.
107. National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13390 (last visited Nov. 21,
2011) (summarizing U.S. state whistleblower retaliation laws).
108. See, e.g., UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998; South Africa Protected Disclosures Act 2000, art. 6,
no. 785; Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010; Japan Whistleblower Protection Act (Act No. 122
of 2004); see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
109. Heinisch v. Germany, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (5th Sec.), app. no. 28274/08 (7/21/11) (citing, at | 37,
Assembly for the Council of Europe, Res. 1729 [2010] on "The Protection of Whistleblowers"), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=888505&portal=hbkm&source=exter-
nalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01Cl 166DEA398649.
110. To the extent that some jurisdictions' whistleblower retaliation laws separately contains a provision
mandating the launch of a whistleblower hotline, for our purposes that would be a "category #1" law, dis-
cussed supra (PartTwo, "Category #1"). Liberia's now-lapsed whistleblower executive order (supra note 64) is
an example-a hybrid retaliation/hotline mandate law. Laws of this type may be emerging, but as of 2011
were extremely rare.
111. An employer that merely structures, communicates, launches, and operates a whistleblower hotline has
not yet arrived at a stage where whistleblower retaliation can possibly come into play. An act alleged to be
retaliatory can happen only after a would-be whistleblower purports to have made (by hotline or otherwise) a
specific denunciation, and after the employer responds in some way that the whistleblower deems
victimizaton.
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faith will suffer retaliation. But globally communicating a non-retaliation commitment
almost surely extends, quasi-contractually, otherwise non-existent anti-retaliation rights to
whistleblowers in jurisdictions without retaliation laws.1 12 Consider carefully the strategic
and legal implications before making an anti-retaliation commitment across borders.
E. CATEGORY # 5: LAws REGULATING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
Probably every jurisdiction imposes some legal doctrines that reach employer investiga-
tions into allegations of employee wrongdoing. Depending on the country and the allega-
tion investigated, an internal investigation might trigger, for example, local laws on labor/
employment, data privacy/protection, tort, crimes, criminal procedure, private-party due
process, and prohibitions against exporting state secrets.' 13 But these doctrines only kick
in after an investigation starts. They have almost no bearing on the launch and staffing of
a global whistleblower hotline because a hotline is a pre-investigatoy tool.)14
This said there is a hotline communication issue here. Heavy-handed communications
about a hotline might later support claimants who allege the employer rigged its investiga-
tion process. For example, imagine a hotline communication that says something to the
effect of "we investigate every report exhaustively, leaving no stone unturned to verify the
truth of reports received." Few organizations are likely to convey so blunt a message, but
if one did the statement might turn up later as evidence supporting a victimization claim.
Ensure communications about report channels do not convey an overzealous approach to
complaint-processing and investigations. Where necessary, such as in Europe, be sure
hotline communications spell out the private due process rights of whistleblowers, wit-
nesses, and targets.
F. CATEGORY # 6: LAWS SILENT ON, BUT POSSIBLY TRIGGERED By,
WHISTLEBLOWER HOTLINES
Having addressed five types of laws that in at least some contexts regulate hotline
whistleblowing specifically, our sixth and final category is broader: legal doctrines that
neither explicitly address hotline whistleblowing nor have yet been interpreted in the hot-
line whistleblowing context, but that a hotline might theoretically trigger. This category
is necessarily vague, and determining which laws fall into it is difficult. Our two most
likely candidates are data protection laws silent on hotlines and labor laws imposing nego-
tiation duties and work rules obligations.
112. A common, perhaps "best," practice is for international hotline communications expressly to guarantee
that the employer will not retaliate against those using the hotline in good faith. Making a no-retaliation
commitment in a global hotline communication almost surely extends non-retaliation rights quasi-contractu-
ally into jurisdictions where local jurisprudence does not specifically protect whistleblowers. And so an em-
ployer voluntarily issuing a non-retaliation promise across all a company's global operations has about the
same effect as if each jurisdiction passed a whistleblower retaliation law.
113. This author has analyzed and inventoried international investigation legal issues elsewhere. Dowling
Investigations, supra note 9.
114. Further, to the extent that ninety-seven percent of whistleblower denunciations come to organizations
outside whistleblowing channels (see supra note 32), most internal company investigations arise outside the
hotline context entirely.
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1. Data Protection Laws Silent on Hotlines
This article already discussed, as "category #3," data protection law doctrines in Europe
that explicitly address whistleblower hotlines. Beyond Europe, more and more jurisdic-
tions around the world now impose European-style omnibus data privacy/protection laws.
Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
South Korea, Taiwan, Uruguay, and others as of 2011 had passed or were implementing
comprehensive (as opposed to sectoral) data protection laws. Some of these are almost as
tough as data laws in Europe. In the future these laws might be argued to reach
whistleblower hodines, paralleling the analysis in Continental Europe."t5 But as of 2011
none of these data laws was known ever to have been interpreted to reach hotlines.
The way Europeans stretch their data laws to reach hotlines may be exceptional.16
Data privacy/protection laws regulate information about identifiable humans, but the
launch and staffing of an employer whistleblower hotline-before it receives a
whistleblower call that might or might not later morph into an internal investigation-
does not implicate any personal data whatsoever, about anybody. A hotline standing alone
does not contain or process personal data about any whistleblower, target, or witness. A
hotline is a mere channel, not a database, and is more analogous to a telephone, computer,
or communications device than to a human resources database warehousing information
about, for example, payroll, attendance, performance management, expense reimburse-
ments, business travel, or benefits/pensionlinsurance administration. For that matter,
even when a real-life whistleblower contacts a company hotline to denounce an identified
colleague, the personal data transmitted get sent by the whistleblower, not the company
hotline sponsor. So even an actual hotline denunciation would not seem to implicate a
hotline sponsor company in processing personal data until the moment the denunciation
ends and hotline staff further processes data received by writing up a report and perhaps
launching an investigation.117 Of course, many but not allils European jurisdictions reject
this analysis and regulate report channels as if they somehow were databases. We have no
way yet to know whether non-European jurisdictions with comprehensive data laws will be
so aggressive.
2. Labor Laws Imposing Negotiation Duties and Work Rules Obligations
Labor laws-specifically mandates imposing labor negotiation duties and obligations
regarding work rules-are another type of law that, although silent on and not yet con-
strued as to stand-alone whistleblower hotlines, could reach workplace report channels."19
115. See supra Part Two, "Category #3." This interpretation is most likely to emerge in those European
states (like, for example, Italy) that have not yet interpreted their data laws in the hotline context but that
might accept the Article 29 Working Party analysis. See "Article 29 Working Party" row on Chart.
116. Of course, we are speaking here specifically about hotlines/report channels, not about whistleblowing
generally, whistleblower retaliation, or internal investigations.
117. Of course, a hotline operator report and an investigation about a specific incident/allegation differ from
a whistleblower hotline. Hotline operator reports and internal company investigations are subject to data
laws.
118. Slovenia does not accept the otherwise-common European interpretation on this point. See "Slovenia"
row on Chart.
119. We are speaking here of an employer's launch and operation of a hotline/report channel, not about
whistleblowing generally, whistleblower retaliation, or internal investigations.
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Labor laws in most every jurisdiction require at least some employers to bargain with
trade unions over certain changes in the workplace. Some jurisdictions also require in-
forming and consulting about new workplace practices with other employee representa-
tives such as works councils, health and safety committees, and ombudsmen.120 But the
texts of collective labor statutes never address hotlines specifically. As of 2011, few if any
regulations, court decisions, or administrative rulings had construed bargaining obliga-
tions as to launching a stand-alone whistleblower hotline.121
An employer subject to labor consultation obligations might take the position that
merely offering a new stand-alone hotline does not change anyone's work conditions and
so is not subject to labor discussions. Employee representatives might counter that having
to work under a hotline regime poisons the work environment because it turns every co-
worker and colleague into a possible spy.1 22 In the United States, unionized employers
have to bargain with their unions before implementing new workplace surveillance tech-
nology like email and video monitoring.123 A U.S. labor union inclined to resist a
whistleblower hotline could characterize it as a sort of monitoring/surveillance tool that
triggers this same bargaining obligation.124 This same analysis could apply abroad, as
well. Whether launching a stand-alone hotline falls under existing bargaining obligations
is rarely settled law. The answer can depend on the comprehensiveness of the local bar-
gaining obligation, the applicable collective agreement, the workplace bargaining history,
and the local society's receptivity or aversion to whistleblowing. Consulting over a stand-
alone hotline will much more likely be held. mandatory in Continental Europe and Hong
Kong than in the Middle East, the Americas, much of Asia, Latin America, or Africa.
In launching a stand-alone whistleblower channel outside the United States, check
whether local worker representatives in each jurisdiction could plausibly argue that new
report procedures trigger mandatory bargaining/consultation. Look into whether existing
collective arrangements address reporting and grievance procedures, whether the society
is whistleblowing-averse, and whether the company's own worker representatives tend to
obstruct most changes to the workplace. Where the employer can convince its worker
representatives why the proposed hotline benefits everyone and is not a material adverse
change, bargaining/consultation should present no hurdle.
But resisting worker consultation over a stand-alone hotline is not always a sound strat-
egy. In whistleblowing-averse societies that suspect hotlines as a form of entrapment,
consultations may make sense to make the hotline effective. And in certain jurisdictions
an affirmative agreement with worker representatives about a hotline can help surmount
120. A discussion of this topic in the whistleblower hotline context appears at Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at
16-18.
121. We are addressing stand-alone hotlines. Of course, plenty of labor cases around the world address the
launch of work rules, codes of conduct, and mandatory reporting rules (see supra note 9), and plenty of cases
adjudicate disputes arising out of specific whistleblower denunciations.
122. Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 17.
123. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006); Cal. Newspapers P'ship & N. Cal.
Media Workers' Guild, 350 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (2007) (email monitoring mandatory subject of bargaining);
Brewers & Maltsters, Local Union No. 6, 414 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), affg Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 342
N.L.R.B. No. 49 (2004) (surveillance cameras mandatory subject of bargaining). See generally Dowling SOX,
supra note 4, at 16-18.
124. Fighting hotlines, though, seems to rank low on U.S. unions' agenda. Indeed, a U.S. union might be
expected to welcome a hotline as a watchdog over abuses of management.
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challenges on grounds beyond labor law. For example, a labor/management works agree-
ment (Betriebsvereinbarung) in Germany and a "plant bargaining agreement" in Austria
that accept a workplace hotline can rebut claims that report procedures violate data pro-
tection laws. Bargaining is also necessary where a hotline does not stand alone but com-
prises a piece of a more extensive compliance program inarguably subject to consultation,
such as a new global code of conduct with a mandatory reporting rule that requires
whistleblowing.125
A workplace hotline can also implicate a separate labor law issue: mandatory work rules.
France, Japan, Korea, and other countries require that employers post written work rules
that list prohibited workplace infractions. A stand-alone whistleblower hotline, as distinct
from a mandatory reporting rule,126 is not a work rule and so should not require changing
already-posted lists of infractions. But a hotline launch that includes a new mandatory
reporting rule likely requires tweaks to extant rules.
IV. Conclusion
Domestically within the United States, launching new work rules, employee handbooks,
and codes of conduct can trigger legal issues, especially in unionized workplaces. And in
the United States, a whistleblower's call to a workplace hotline triggers a cluster of legal
issues, such as internal investigations, employee discipline, and whistleblower retaliation.
But U.S. employers, even unionized ones that make a stand-alone workplace
whistleblower hotline available to U.S. staff, rarely get blowback.127 Indeed, offering em-
ployee report "procedures" stateside affirmatively complies with a mandate in Sarbanes-
Oxley and is a recommended "best practice" response to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
bounty.128
But the U.S. laissez faire approach here can lull multinationals into overlooking or min-
imizing the surprisingly steep compliance hurdles to launching whistleblower procedures
across worldwide affiliates. Six distinct legal doctrines can restrict hotline whistleblowing
abroad. Our U.S. point of view sees hodines as a best practice for nurturing compliance
by rooting out crimes and corruption. So to us these six restrictions look like technicali-
ties grown bigger and more complex than they should have any right to get. For that
matter, Americans have a hard time understanding why laws anywhere would restrict
whistleblower hotlines when no jurisdiction bothers to restrict whistleblowing itself and
when the vast majority of whistleblowers-ninety-seven percent-tend to avoid hotlines,
anyway.129
But this policy analysis takes us only so far when legal restrictions already in place
around the world actively restrict employers' freedom to launch a workplace
125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (on mandatory reporting rules). See, e.g., Wal-Mart, Wuppertal
Labour Court, 5th Div., 5 BV 20/05, June 15, 2005 (Germany), discussed at Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 17
(code of conduct with mandatory reporting rule held subject to mandatory information, consultation, and co-
determination with works council in Germany).
126. Supra note 125.
127. But cf supra note 121 and accompanying text (hotline launch as possible mandatory subject of U.S.
labor union bargaining).
128. Supra Part H, "Category #1" and "Category #2."
129. Ethics Resource Center, supra note 32.
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whistleblower hotline. Employees in whistleblowing-averse societies like Russia, Latin
America, the Middle East, India, much of Asia, and Africa can fear hotlines as entrapment.
Meanwhile, data protection laws in Europe actively block hotlines, and violations can
spark passionate resistance from European workforces and can trigger punitive sanctions.
So launching an international report channel has become a global compliance project of
its own. Before making a hotline available to employees worldwide, check which of the six
legal topics arise in each relevant jurisdiction. Isolate, in each affected country, those
issues the hotline will trigger under local law. Then take steps to make reporting proto-
cols and employee communications packages comply.
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